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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In five previous Georgia and Eleventh Circuit evidence survey articles,
the author extolled the virtues of the proposed Georgia Rules of Evidence.' These rules roughly tracked the Federal Rules of Evidence and
would replace Georgia's existing evidence code which is, in reality, not a
code at all but rather a jumble of disjointed statutes found in several
different titles of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated and countless
court decisions. The proposed rules were first introduced in the General
Assembly in 1989 and were approved by the Senate in 1990 and 1991 but
have never been reported out of the House Judiciary Committee. Given
the rather tepid treatment the rules have received by the General Assembly, the prospects for a new and improved Georgia evidence code appear
to be dim. This Article, however, will continue in the tradition of past
Georgia survey articles and will follow the organizational format of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
II. OBJECTIONS

The need for precise objections is demonstrated by the court of appeals
decision in Yelverton v. State.2 In Yelverton defendant objected to the
admission of a photograph, claiming that it was irrelevant. On appeal,
defendant argued that the photograph improperly put his character in
* Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State

College (B.A., 1978); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1981). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.

1, Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 43 MERCER L. RE. 1173 (1992); Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, 43 MERCER L. Rav. 257 (1991); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REV.
1451 (1991); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REv. 223 (1990); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 41 MERCER L. REV. 1357 (1990); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 41 MERCER L.
REV. 175 (1989); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 40 MERCER L. REV. 1291 (1989); Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, 40 MERCER L. REv. 225 (1988).
2. 199 Ga. App. 41, 403 S.E.2d 816 (1991).
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issue. Although the general objection that the photograph was irrelevant
arguably encompassed the specific objection that the photograph improperly impugned his character, the court held that the objection was insufficient.3 In fact it is well-established that the commonly heard objection
that evidence is irrelevant, immaterial, and prejudicial is not sufficient to
preserve an issue for appeal."
Similarly, in Haynes v. State," the court of appeals held that defendant
waived his right to object to the erroneous exclusion of evidence.' In
Haynes the trial court refused to allow defendant to prove that a witness
had criminal charges pending against him. On appeal defendant argued
that he should have been allowed to impeach the witness by establishing
that he may have been offered lenient treatment in exchange for
favorable testimony. Defendant, however, did not specifically urge the
evidence for this reason and thus did not preserve
trial court to admit the
7
the issue for appeal.

The appellate courts are not always so strict. In Shaver v. State,$ defendant clearly failed to object to the admission of hearsay evidence. A
majority of the court of appeals relied upon the principle, unique to Georgia, that" 'hearsay has no probative value even if admitted without objection,'" and because the remaining evidence was insufficient to prove defendant's guilt, reversed defendant's conviction.0
As most civil trial lawyers know, the supreme court held in Denton v.
Con-Way Southern Express, Inc.'0 that the abolition of the collateral
source rule by the Tort Reform Act of 198711 violated the equal protection clause of the Georgia Constitution."2 Although a profound relief to
lawyers representing plaintiffs in personal injury cases, this decision
caused some consternation for lawyers who tried cases after the enactment of the Tort Reform Act but prior to Denton and who failed to object to the admission of evidence of collateral source payments. These
lawyers cannot be faulted; few would have thought that the abolition of
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 43, 403 S.E.2d at 818.
See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 41
199 Ga. App. 288, 404 S.E.2d 585 (1991).
Id. at 291, 404 S.E.2d at 588.
Id. at 290, 404 S.E.2d at 588.

MERCER

L. REV+ 175, 176 (1989).

8. 199 Ga. App. 428, 405 S.E.2d 281 (1991).
9. Id. at 429-30, 405 S.E.2d at 282 (quoting Germany v. State, 235 Ga. 836, 840, 221
S.E.2d 817, 820 (1976); Collins v. State, 146 Ga. App. 857, 859-60, 247 S.E.2d 602, 604
(1978)). Appellate courts are somewhat selective in their application of this rule. See, e.g.,
Alexander v. State, 199 Ga. App. 228, 404 S.E.2d 616 (1991) (discussion of no probative
value of hearsay).
10. 261 Ga. 41, 402 S.E.2d 269 (1991).
11. 1987 Ga. Laws 917 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 51-12-1(b)(1992)).
12. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2; 261 Ga. at 42, 402 S.E.2d at 271-72.
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the collateral source rule could have possibly violated Georgia's Constitution. Fortunately for those lawyers who did not object to the admission of
collateral source payments and perhaps in implicit recognition of their
3 that the failure to
plight, the court of appeals held in Anepohl v. Ferber1
object to the admission of such evidence does not preclude a subsequent
appeal." The court relied upon its authority to review a substantially erroneous jury charge that is harmful as a matter of law even though an
objection was not made to the charge.1 The court held that an instruction to the jury allowing it to consider collateral source benefits when calculating damage deprived plaintiff of a fair trial. 6
In Rosequist v. Pratt,7 the court of appeals thoughtfully offered guid-

ance to trial judges and lawyers concerning the use of motions in limine.
Although the court acknowledged the utility of motions in limine to prevent the jury from hearing inadmissible evidence, the court noted the difficulty the moving party faces in establishing a basis for the exclusion of
the disputed evidence because the trial judge does not know exactly what
evidence will be offered at trial. 8 Certainly all trial lawyers have heard
judges say they will simply have to wait to see what the evidence shows
before ruling on the admissibility of evidence. To avoid this dilemma, the
court of appeals suggested that trial judges require the party offering the
evidence to make an offer of proof so the trial judge will know precisely
the evidence which will be tendered and the record will be preserved for
appeal. 1 ' If, on the other hand, the trial court grants the motion in limine,
as it did in Rosequist, the court of appeals warned lawyers to make an
evidence, something that the appellant in
offer of proof of the excluded
20
Rosequist neglected to do.

III.

RELEVANCY

Relevancy of Extrinsic Act Evidence

A.

Perhaps the most problematic area of evidence law is that concerning
"extrinsic act evidence." Extrinsic act evidence, generally, is evidence of
conduct on occasions other than the one at issue. Such evidence is "extrinsic" to the transaction or incident in issue, and, as a general rule, is
inadmissible. Like the rule against hearsay, however, the rule against ex13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

202 Ga. App. 552, 415 S.E.2d 9 (1992).
Id. at 552-53, 415 S.E.2d at 10.
Id.
Id.
201 Ga. App. 45, 410 S.E.2d 316 (1991).
Id. at 46, 410 S.E.2d at 317.
Id. at 46 n.1, 410 S.E.2d at 318 n.1.
Id. at 46, 410 S.E.2d at 318.
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trinsic act evidence is known more by its exceptions than its flat prohibition. Extrinsic act evidence may be admissible for a substantive purpose,
for example, evidence of a prior drunk driving conviction to prove entitlement to punitive damages; or it may be admissible to impeach or bolster
a witness, for example, evidence of a felony conviction to impeach a witness' character.
Before addressing the exceptions to the rule excluding extrinsic act evidence, it is necessary to consider the preliminary question of whether the
proffered evidence is, in fact, extrinsic to the act at issue. The res gestae
doctrine, although used more frequently to admit hearsay evidence, also
permits the introduction of evidence that may seem extrinsic to the act at
issue but is admissible because of the relationship between the extrinsic
act and the act at issue. In Rollins v. State,21 the trial court admitted
evidence of a transaction involving police officers and a visitor to defendant's home while the officers were searching the home. The visitor, unaware of the officers' true identities, asked if defendant was home. An officer replied that defendant was not home but he had asked the officer to
"take care of business for him."22 The visitor proceeded to purchase drugs
from the officer.23 Defendant contended that this incident constituted
similar transaction evidence within the purview of Uniform Superior
Court Rule 31.3,24 which requires the prosecution to give defendant advance notice if it intends to use similar transaction evidence. The court of
appeals disagreed, concluding that the evidence was a part of the res gestae and thus was not extrinsic to the act in issue. 5
Evidence of Similar or Related Transactions. It is ironic that
Georgia courts routinely admit evidence of similar transactions in criminal cases, when life and freedom are at stake, but are extremely reluctant
to admit evidence of similar transactions in civil cases. To a point, however, the logic for this is apparent. Civil cases typically do not involve
issues of intent or motive. Thus, for example, admission of evidence of a
prior automobile accident in a negligence case involving an unrelated subsequent accident would serve only to prove the improper and prejudicial
point that defendant, because he was negligent on a prior occasion, was
more likely negligent on the occasion at issue. In a criminal case, evidence
of a prior burglary committed by a defendant which involved similar facts
to the charged offense may tend to prove defendant's motive or intent in
committing the charged offense. In this situation, the prior transaction is
21.
22.

202 Ga. App. 88, 413 S.E.2d 261 (1991).
Id. at 88, 413 S.E.2d at 261.

23. Id.
24. GA. UNIF.
25.

SUP. CT.

R. 31.3(b) (1992).

202 Ga. App. at 88, 413 S.E.2d at 262.
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not being used to show that a defendant is of bad character and thus
more likely to have committed the offense but rather is relevant to a legitimate issue. Thus, evidence of similar or related transactions is not admissible to prove that a person acted in conformity with his prior conduct, but may be admissible to prove identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent
of mind, or course of conduct.2
The reality of the situation, however, is that evidence of prior criminal
acts is extremely prejudicial in a criminal case, and many criminal defense lawyers criticize the liberal use of similar transaction evidence by
Georgia prosecutors. Prior surveys have noted the tendency of Georgia's
appellate courts to affirm perfunctorily convictions in which prosecutors
relied heavily on evidence of other offenses allegedly committed by defendants in order to obtain those convictions." The supreme court seems
to have recognized that this liberal policy may have been taken too far.
The first indication of the supreme court's concern came in Stephens v.
State.2 1 In Stephens, defendant, who was charged with selling cocaine,
contended that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a prior
conviction for selling cocaine. To prove the prior conviction, the prosecution relied solely upon a certified copy of the conviction. Although the
prosecution offered some evidence of the details of the prior offense at a
pretrial hearing to determine the admissibility of the conviction, the pros29
ecution offered no such evidence at trial.
In its decision, the supreme court first emphasized the general rule that
evidence of prior criminal offenses simply is not admissible.30 This is true
even though the prior offense involves the same type of conduct alleged in
a subsequent charge. Evidence of a prior offense is admissible as similar
transaction evidence only if two conditions are met. First, the prosecution
must prove that the defendant committed the prior offense; and, second,
"'there must be sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged, that proof of the former tends to
prove the latter.' ,s Because the prosecution did not offer evidence at
trial establishing the similarity between the charged offense and the prior
offense, the supreme court reversed defendant's conviction.32 Justice Bell
26. See, e.g., Walraven v. State, 250 Ga. 401, 297 S.E.2d 278 (1982).
27. See supra note I and accompanying text.
28. 261 Ga. 467, 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991).
29. Id. at 468, 405 S.E.2d at 485.
30. Id. at 469, 405 S.E.2d at 485.
31. Id., 405 S.E.2d at 485-86 (quoting State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 655, 272 S.E.2d 321,
322 (1980)).
32. Id.
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dissented, contending that the conviction itself was sufficient to establish
the requisite similarity between the two offenses. 3 "
The supreme court returned to this issue in Williams v. State,34 and
issued firm guidelines for the admission of evidence of similar or related
transactions. 3 5 In Williams defendant contended the trial court erred by
admitting a certified copy of his previous conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Defendant was on trial for a subsequent
charge of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.3 The supreme
court held that the prosecution must prove three elements at the pretrial
hearing required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 to determine the
admissibility of similar transaction evidence.37 First, the prosecution must
prove that the independent transaction is relevant to a legitimate issue.3 8
Second, the prosecution must prove that the defendant committed the
independent offense or act.3 9 Third, the prosecution must prove there is a
sufficient connection or similarity between the prior act or offense and the
charged offense.' The trial court then must make a specific determination that the prosecution has carried its burden in proving each of the
three elements. The supreme court reaffirmed its holding in Stephens,
which held that even if the trial court- determines evidence of the prior
offense is admissible, the prosecution cannot simply introduce a certified
copy of the conviction at trial.41 Rather, the prosecution must present
evidence to the jury establishing that the accused committed the prior
offense, and that the prior offense is sufficiently similar or related to the
charged offense.'3 In Williams the prosecution did not inform the trial
33. Id. at 471, 405 S.E.2d at 487 (Bell, J., dissenting).
34. 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).
35. Id. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.
36. Id. at 641, 409 S.E.2d at 650.
37. Id. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.
38. Id. It should be noted that this requirement-that the'prosecutor state specifically
the purpose for which the evidence is being offered-has long been advocated by Judge
Beasley. See Bernyk v. State, 182 Ga. App. 329, 332, 355 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1987). In fact in a
case decided just eight months before Williams, Judge Beasley, in a concurring opinion,
again urged that the "State should be required to articulate the purpose for which such
damaging generally inadmissible evidence is offered, so that the court can judge whether it
is relevant to an issue in the particular case, that is, whether there is a logical connection
before the evidence is admitted." Johnson v. State, 199 Ga. App. 144, 146, 404 S.E.2d 455
(1991) (Beasley, J., concurring).
39. 261 Ga. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651. However, as discussed in prior surveys, it is not
necessary that the prosecutor prove this beyond a reasonable doubt; it is sufficient to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed the act or offense in question. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 40 MERCER L. REV. 225, 231 (1988).
40. 261 Ga. at 642, 409 S.E.2d at 651.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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court of the purpose for which the prior offense was being offered, thus
making it "impossible for the trial court to make the essential preliminary determination as to whether the state was introducing the evidence
for an appropriate purpose.' 3 Moreover, the prosecution adduced no evidence at trial other than the certified copy of the conviction. For these
44
reasons, the supreme court reversed defendant's conviction.
The court of appeals quickly took notice of the supreme court's decisions in Stephens and Williams, and in Little v. "State,4 reversed defendant's conviction because the prosecution offered no evidence of defendant's prior offenses other than certified copies of his convictions. 46 The
court also noted that the trial court failed to hold a pretrial hearing,
which the supreme court held in Williams was required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3.' 7
The appellate courts did more during the survey period than simply
adopt procedural safeguards to prevent undue prejudice to defendants.
They took a more substantive look at similar transaction evidence to ensure that it was sufficiently similar to the charged offense to be admissible. In Faison v. State'4 the court of appeals, clarifying an earlier decision, held that a prior conviction for a drug offense is not automatically
admissible in a subsequent trial for another drug offense.' The prosecution still must show a sufficient connection or similarity between the prior
offense and the charged offense before it is admissible. In Kuchenmeister
v. State, 0 the court of appeals held that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of defendant's prior acts of child abuse in his trial for arson. 51 In Burney v. State, the court of appeals held that the trial court
improperly admitted evidence of defendant's nine year old conviction for
burglary in his trial for burglary and attempt to commit rape." Finally, in
Radford v. State," the court of appeals held that in defendant's trial for
theft by taking, the trial court improperly admitted evidence of defend-

43. Id. at 643, 409 S.E.2d at 651.
44. Id.
45. 202 Ga. App. 7, 413 S.E.2d 496 (1991).
46. Id. at 8, 413 S.E.2d at 497.
47. Id. at 7, 413 S.E.2d at 497.
48. 199 Ga. App. 447, 405 S.E.2d 277 (1991).
49. Id. at 448, 405 S.E.2d at 278. See Whitley v. State, 193 Ga. App. 192, 387 S.E.2d 348
(1989).
50. 199 Ga. App. 64, 403 S.E.2d 847 (1991).
51. Id. at 66, 403 S.E.2d at 849.
52. 201 Ga. App. 64, 410 S.E.2d 172 (1991).
53. Id. at 65, 410 S.E.2d at 173.
54. 202 Ga. App. 532, 415 S.E.2d 34 (1992).
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ant's prior convictions for theft by taking, noting that the factual circumstances of the prior convictions were dissimilar to the charged offense."
It is dangerous to predict trends in the law. It does seem, however, that
the Georgia Appellate courts have radically shifted their level of scrutiny
of similar or related transaction evidence.
Evidence of Character as Substantive Evidence. Last year's
evidence survey addressed the supreme court's landmark holding in
Chandler v. State" that a defendant may introduce evidence of specific
acts of violence by a victim against a third person when the defendant
claims he was justified in killing the victim."' Since Chandler,neither the
supreme court nor the court of appeals has addressed a significant question arguably not answered by Chandler. Chandlercan be read, and perhaps only can be read, to hold that evidence of specific prior violent acts
by the victim is admissible as character evidence (rather than as similar
transaction evidence), and thus, is admissible for the specific purpose of
demonstrating that "it is more probable that a person will act in accordance with his character (disposition) than he will act contrary to it."" In
Chandler the majority noted that it found Justice Weltner's concurring
opinion in Lolly "persuasive." 59 Justice Benham concurred specially in
Chandler to note his disagreement with Justice Weltner's concurring
opinion in Lolly and the supreme court's apparent adoption of this opinion in Chandler." Justice Benham argued that evidence of a victim's
prior violent acts should be admitted as similar transaction evidence and
not as character evidence."1 He feared that the adoption of a character
evidence analysis would be "a move to replace trial by evidence with trial
by character assassination. 6 2 Justice Benham forcefully argued that "this
revolutionary change in the law of evidence is a throw back to frontier
days and gives judicial sanction to a new defense to murder: the victim
'needed killing.',,
Relevancy of Prior Sexual Behavior. Georgia's rape shield statute generally prohibits the admission of evidence of a rape victim's past

55. Id. at 535, 415 S.E.2d at 37.
56. 261 Ga. 402, 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991).
57. Id. at 407, 405 S.E.2d at 673. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 43 MERCER L. Rev.
257, 263-64 (1991).
58. Lolley v. State, 259 Ga. 605, 610, 385 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1989) (Weltner, Bell & Hunt,
JJ., concurring) (quoting Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 830, 218 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1975)).
59. 261 Ga. at 402, 405 S.E.2d at 673.
60, Id. at 408-09, 405 S.E.2d at 674 (Benham, J., concurring specially).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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sexual behavior."4 Georgia courts have traditionally applied the statute
with vigor. Recent cases suggest, however, that Georgia's appellate courts
may be willing to allow defendants greater latitude to adduce evidence
relating to prior sexual activity." For example, in' White v. State," defendant attempted to introduce evidence establishing that the alleged victim suffered from sexually transmitted diseases and vaginal infections.
Defendant offered this evidence to counter the victim's testimony that
she was diagnosed as having a venereal disease two weeks after the alleged rape, that she contracted this disease from defendant, and that a
physical examination conducted immediately after the alleged rape did
not reveal any vaginal infections. Defendant testified that the victim was
a prostitute and he refused to have sexual intercourse after he saw that
the victim's body was "very filthy" and that she had "discharge.'
The court of appeals reversed defendant's conviction, holding, with little discussion, that the evidence did not run afoul of the rape shield statute6 8 The court reasoned that the proffered evidence was not evidence of
the victim's past sexual behavior but was relevant to defendant's claim
that he did not.have intercourse with the victim because of her poor hygiene 9 In addition, the court admitted testimony to impeach the victim's
claim that the physical examination conducted immediately after the alleged rape did not reveal vaginal infections and discharges, and to disprove the victim's claim that the defendant caused the vaginal
70
infections.
During last year's survey period, the supreme court held that the rape
shield statute does not bar the admission of evidence of an alleged victim's false accusations of sexual misconduct against third parties.7 ' The
court ruled, however, .that the lower court, before admitting such evidence, must make an initial determination of whether there exists a reasonable probability that the accusation is false.' 2 In Shelton v. States
the court of appeals reversed defendant's conviction because the trial
court excluded evidence of false accusations without making this threshold determination.7 However, the court held that this error could be
64. O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 (Supp. 1992).
65. See cases discussed at Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REV. 223, 234-35 (1990)
and 43 MERCER L. REV. 257, 265-66 (1991).
66. 201 Ga. App. 53, 410 S.E.2d 441 (1991).
67. Id. at 53, 410 S.E.2d at 441.
68. Id. at 55, 410 S.E.2d at 443.
69. Id. at 54, 410 S.E.2d at 442.
70. Id. at 54-55, 410 S.E.2d at 442-43.
71. Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989).
72. Id. at 137, 377 S.E.2d at 160.
73. 196 Ga. App. 163, 395 S.E.2d 618 (1990).
74. Id. at 164, 395 S.E.2d at 620.
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cured by a post trial hearing to determine whether defendant could adduce sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable probability of falsity.75
Consequently, the court remanded the case and, the court of appeals held
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
evidence adduced by defendant at the post trial7 hearing was not sufficient
to establish a reasonable probability of falsity.

B. Evidence of Settlement Discussions
The principle that "admissions or propositions made with a view to a
compromise are not proper evidence"' 7 is most likely known to any trial
attorney who has attempted to negotiate a settlement. However, as illustrated in Dyer v. Investors Services, Inc.," 8 the mere fact that evidence
relates to settlement discussions does not necessarily mean that the evidence is inadmissible. In Dyer the trial court admitted evidence of an
agreement between appellant's principals that specified who would be responsible for the debt allegedly owed to appellee. Appellant. contended
that evidence of this settlement agreement was inadmissible pursuant to
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 24-3-37.'0 The
court of appeals disagreed. The purpose of the prohibition against the
admission of settlement evidence is to facilitate settlement discussions
between or among parties to a dispute. The settlement agreement in
question was not an agreement between appellant and appellee but rather
was an agreement to which appellee was not a party."' Thus, the court
held the admission of the evidence could not have frustrated any settlement negotiations between the parties.' Therefore, although evidence of
settlement discussions between parties may be inadmissible, evidence of
discussions preparatory to negotiations which do not include both parties
are admissible.
Moreover, a mere offer to pay an obligation is not necessarily considered an offer to compromise and thus inadmissible. In Rosequist v.
82
Pratt,
defendant, the day after her involvement in a motor vehicle colli-

sion that resulted in the death of a child, offered to pay the family's medical and funeral expenses. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court ruled this
evidence inadmissible because it was in the nature of a settlement offer. 83
75. Id.
76. Shelton v. State, 199 Ga. App. 506, 405 S.E.2d 123 (1991).

77. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-37 (1982).
78.
79.
50.
81.
82.
83.

200 Ga. App. 634, 409 S.E.2d 249 (1991).
Id. at 636, 404 S.E.2d at 251.
Id. at 635, 409 S.E.2d at 251.
Id. at 635-36, 409 S.E.2d at 251.
201 Ga. App. 45, 410 S.E.2d 316 (1991).
Id. at 46, 410 S.E.2d at 318.
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However, the court of appeals concluded that defendant's offer to pay
hospital and funeral expenses was not made in an effort to compromise or
settle a claim.8 ' The court of appeals explained that the offer was inadmissible because it was not an admission of liability.85 Rather, the court
of appeals concluded that "'activity constituting a voluntary offer of assistance made on the impulse of benevolence or sympathy should be encouraged and should not be considered as an admission of liability.',"
Thus, offers to pay medical expenses may be inadmissible either because
they are an offer to compromise or because they are expressions of benevolence or sympathy rather than admissions of liability.
C. Miscellaneous Relevancy Issues
In Turner v. W. E. Pruett Co.,8 7 plaintiff moved in limine to preclude
defendant from mentioning in the presence of the jury that plaintiff filed
his lawsuit only shortly before the two year statute of limitations had run.
The trial court denied plaintiff's motion after defendant's attorney stated
that although he might not include it in his opening statement, it might
be mentioned during cross examination of witnesses because the delayed
filing "certainly [went] to the credibility of witnesses." 8 At trial plaintiff's attorney first mentioned the time of filing of the complaint. The
court of appeals held that the trial court erroneously denied plaintiff's
motion."' Although the court agreed that the passage of time may be relevant to the credibility of a witness's testimony, the time that passes between the incident and the filing of the lawsuit "has absolutely no arguable relevancy whatsoever to the credibility of the plaintiff's
eyewitnesses." 0 The court stated that if the complaint is timely filed, the
date of filing is of no relevancy to any issue in the case.81 Moreover, the
fact that plaintiff's attorney made first mention of the date of filing was
immaterial.' 2 Clearly, plaintiff's attorney, his motion in limine having
been denied, mentioned this "harmful fact" himself in order to minimize
its harmful effect. Judges Sognier, Beasley, and Andrews dissented, arguing that plaintiff could not complain because his lawyer first mentioned
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Gray v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 45, 52-53, 192 S.E.2d 521,
526 (1972)).
87. 202 Ga. App. 287, 414 S.E.2d 248 (1991).
88. Id. at 288, 414 S.E.2d at 249.
89. Id.
90. Id.

91. Id.
92. Id.
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the subject in the presence of the jury.' 3 Moreover, the^ delay in filing is
relevant because it arguably supports defendant's contention that the
credibility of several witnesses who testified on behalf of plaintiff affected
by the passage of time since they would have to come forward to give
their testimony.94
In Barnes v. Wall," the court of appeals held that the testimony of an
annuity expert concerning the potential future value of a plaintiff's settlement proceeds from a codefendant is irrelevant."1 Although the amount
received by a plaintiff in settlement from codefendant may be relevant to
for the plaintiff's
determine the remaining codefendant's responsibility
7
not.'
is
settlement
the
of
value
future
the
injuries,
To be relevant, evidence must logically tend to establish the proposition which it is offered to prove."1 Generally, the determination of relevancy is made by the court. The court of appeals decision in Hunter v.
Hardnett" addressed the role of the trial court in determining relevancy.
In Hunter defendant claimed the trial court erred when it admitted a
municipal court record of the disposition of a traffic citation against defendant. Plaintiff's suit against defendant arose from this traffic accident.
The record indicated that defendant pleaded guilty and was found
guilty.100 A plea of guilty is admissible as an admission, but an adjudication of guilt is not admissible. 10 1 Defendant moved in limine to preclude
the admission of the record, contending that he did not plea guilty. 102 The
court denied his motion. 03 The court of appeals held, notwithstanding
the ambiguity of the record, that it was "relevant if interpreted by the
jury as plea of guilty."" Acknowledging that determinations of relevancy
are generally a question for the trial court, the court stated that the jury
should be allowed to consider evidence when its relevancy is doubtful.' 06
Moreover, the undue prejudice of this evidence did not outweigh its probative value. 106 In dissent, Judge Beasley, joined by Judge Carley, wrote
that the citation was inadmissible because it "did not show what it was
93. Id. at 290, 414 S.E.2d at 250 (Sognier, Beasley & Andrews, JJ., dissenting).

94. Id. at 290, 414 S.E.2d at 251 (Sognier, Beasley & Andrews, JJ., dissenting).
95. 201 Ga. App. 228, 411 S.E.2d 270 (1991).

96, Id. at 228, 411 S.E.2d at 271.
97. Id.
THOMAS F. GREENE, GEORGIA LAW OF EVIDENCE
99. 199 Ga. App. 443, 405 S.E.2d 286 (1991).
100. Id. at 443, 405 S.E.2d at 287.

98.

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 444, 405 S.E.2d at 288.
104. Id. at 443, 405 S.E.2d at 287.

105. Id.
106. Id. at

444, 405 S.E.2d

at 288.

§ 61 (3d ed. 1988)..
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offered to show, that he had pled guilty."' 07 The citation was not admissible unless it appeared to the satisfaction of the trial court that it constituted a plea of guilty. Because of the ambiguity of the record, it was not
possible, Judge Beasley wrote, for the trial court to arrive at such a
conclusion.108
IV. PRIVILEGES
When two or more people retain an attorney to represent them jointly,
communications between the attorney and any of the clients are not considered privileged, insofar as the other clients are concerned. Thus, these
communications are admissible in subsequent litigation between or
among the clients. 109 This is known as the joint attorney exception to the
attorney/client privilege. In Peterson v. Baumwell,"10 the court of appeals
considered the effect of the presence of other parties to the litigation on
the joint attorney exception to the attorney/client privilege. In Peterson a
former client of an attorney filed a crossclaim against the other former
client. Both clients had sued a third party, charging that party with fraud
in connection with a real estate transaction. When one client began to
suspect the other client of complicity in fraud, he asserted his crossclaim.
The trial court ordered the attorney who represented the clients jointly to
respond to questions posed by the client asserting the crossclaim. On interlocutory appeal, the other client asserted that, notwithstanding the
joint attorney exception, the attorney should not be compelled to disclose
the substance of communications because of the presence of defendant,
who was a stranger to the clients' relationship with their former
attorney.'
The court of appeals concluded that defendant's presence did not
render the joint attorney exception inapplicable." 2 First, the court ruled
that the client who allegedly conspired with defendant had waived any
right to contest the trial court's ruling."' More substantively, the court
ruled that the peculiar circumstances of the case did not render the joint
attorney exception inapplicable." 4 Defendant, the court reasoned, was allegedly a party to the conspiracy with the complaining client."' Thus, if
the attorney's information tended to prove the conspiracy, then the infor107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 446, 405 S.E.2d at 289 (Beasley & Carley, JJ., dissenting).
Id.
GREEN, supra note 98, § 185.
202 Ga. App. 283, 414 S.E.2d 278 (1991).
Id. at 284, 414 S.E.2d at 280.
Id. at 285, 414 S.E.2d at 281.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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mation was probably already known to defendant.. Accordingly, the court
concluded that the disclosure of the communications to defendant would
not result in irreparable harm."" In apparent dicta, the court of appeals
noted that the effect of the joint attorney exception was to waive the attorney/client privilege. 1 7 If this was the case, the court continued, then
the presence of third parties in the litigation does not affect the joint
attorney exception." 8 If the privilege is waived, it is waived regardless of
the presence of strangers to the relationship.
In Brown v.State,11 9 the court of appeals addressed rather interesting
issues involving the marital privilege. Defendant in Brown was charged
with stealing drugs from an evidence file in the district attorney's office
while he was waiting to be called as a witness. Defendant's wife observed
the theft.1 0 The trial court permitted the wife to testify and, on appeal,
defendant contended that his conduct in 'the presence of his wife constituted a confidential marital communication and therefore was inadmissible. " ' The court of appeals acknowledged that conduct may be considered a confidential communication entitled to the protection of the
privilege, but the conduct "must be in the nature of an assertive communication where the action itself is as much a communication as would be
words describing it."1 2 The court of appeals concluded that defendant
had not carried his burden of proving that his conduct was intended to be
a confidential communication.1 2 Judges Pope, Sognier, Carley, and
Cooper dissented. 24 Judge Pope wrote that "[diefendant could not have
more directly communicated to his wife the fact that he committed the
crime than by committing it in her presence." 12' Clearly, Judge Pope reasoned, defendant would not have stolen the drugs while his wife watched
if he had not thought he could rely on the confidential relationship he
had with his wife.' 2 '

116. Id.
117. Id.

118. Id.
119.

199 Ga. App. 188, 404 S.E.2d 469 (1991).

120. Id. at 188, 404 S.E.2d at 469.
121. 'See O.C.G.A. § 24-9-21(1) (1982).

-

122.

199 Ga: App. at 190, 404 S.E.2d at 471.

123.

Id., 404 S.E.2d at 471-72.

124.

Id., 404 S.E.2d at 472 (Pope, Sognier, Carley & Cooper, JJ., dissenting).

125.

Id. at 191, 404 S.E.2d at 472.

126.

Id.
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V.

A.

WITNESSES

Impeachment by Evidence of Character

The supreme court's restriction of the use of similar transaction evidence and the expansion of the use of evidence of a victim's character (or
at least the use of evidence of similar transactions by the'victim), arguably suggests that the appellate courts are retreating somewhat from a
pro-prosecution tilt. Further evidence of this trend can be found in recent
decisions addressing the improper use of evidence of a defendant's bad
character. Four years ago in Jones v. State,' the supreme court sharply
curtailed the prosecution's ability to impeach a defendant with evidence
of bad- character. During the current survey period, it seemed that the
court of appeals was somewhat more vigorous in its efforts to stop the
improper use of character evidence.
In Ledford v. State,' 8 the trial court permitted an investigating officer
to testify that another witness said that defendant had a reputation "for
cutting people. 12 9 Noting that defendant had not placed his character in
issue, the court of appeals pointedly noted that the State could cite "no
controlling or persuasive' authority for the proposition that the general
reputation of the accused for violence may be admissible for any purpose
where, as here, the accused himself has not first put his own character
into issue.' 30 Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's conviction.",
In Chapman v. State,'32 the prosecution stated in its closing argument
that defendant, who was charged with aggravated assault, told the investigating officer that he was not driving at the time of the alleged assault
because his driver's license had been suspended. Actually, the officer
merely testified that defendant said he did not have a driver's license. 3
The court of appeals held that the prosecution's argument suggested that
defendant had a criminal record and thus impugned his character. 34 Because defendant had not placed his character in issue, the court reversed
defendant's conviction.3 5 Judge Andrews dissented, arguing that the
127. 257 Ga. 753, 363 S.E.2d 529 (1988).
128. 202 Ga. App. 694, 415 S.E.2d 693 (1992).
129. Id. at 695, 415 S.E.2d at 694. The witness who allegedly made this testimony denied
knowledge of defendant's reputation when he testified at trial. Therefore, if defendant's reputation had been relevant, the witness's pretrial statement would have been admissible either as impeachment evidence or as substantive evidence. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-83; Gibbons v.
State, 248 Ga. 858, 862, 286 S.E.2d 717, 721 (1982).
130. 202 Ga. App. at 695, 415 S.E.2d at 694..
131. Id.
132. 202 Ga. App. 267, 414 S.E.2d 240 (1991).
133. Id. at 268, 414 S.E.2d at 241.
134. Id. at 268-69, 414 S.E.2d at 242.

135. Id.
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prosecutor's incorrect statement did not place defendant's character in
issue because a license can be suspended for reasons other than criminal
misconduct." 6
In Johnson v. State,' 7 the court of appeals reversed defendant's conviction because the trial court permitted the prosecution to crossexamine
defendant about his knowledge of an acquaintance's prior convictions for
selling cocaine.' Defendant, who himself was charged with selling cocaine, claimed as an alibi that he was with the acquaintance at the time
of the alleged offense.""9 The court of appeals concluded that the testimony was an effort to prove defendant guilty by association. 40 Judge
Beasley, in her dissent, argued that this evidence was relevant because it
tended to explain "the absence of the only witness who allegedly could
give direct evidence that defendant was not present at the scene when the
crime as charged occurred."'
Finally, in Chisholm v. State, 4 2 the court of appeals reaffirmed that a
prosecutor can ask a defendant's character witness if he has heard of specific acts of bad conduct on the part of defendant only if the questions
143
are posed in good faith and are based upon reliable information.
B. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction
As suggested above, when analyzing the admissibility of extrinsic act
evidence, it is often critical to first determine whether the evidence is
being offered for a substantive purpose or to impeach or bolster a witness.
This is particularly true when attempting to determine the admissibility
of a guilty plea or conviction. Georgia law governing the use of convictions to impeach a witness is difficult enough without confusing the issue
by subjecting substantive evidence to the scrutiny required for impeachment evidence. Had this been done in Jabaley v. Mitchell,"4' plaintiff's
attorney might have received a more welcome reception in the court of
appeals. In Jabaley defendant pled nolo contendere to a misdemeanor
battery against plaintiff. In plaintiff's subsequent civil suit against de136. Id. at 269, 414 S.E.2d at 242 (Andrews & Beasley, JJ., dissenting in part).
137. 202 Ga. App. 590, 415 S.E.2d 189 (1992).
138. Id. at 591, 415 S.E.2d at 189.
139. Id.
140. Id., 415 S.E.2d at 190.
141. Id. at 592, 415 S.E.2d at 190 (Beasley, J., dissenting). See also Bacon v. State, 201
Ga. App. 639, 411 S.E.2d 783 (1991) and Moon v. State, 202 Ga. App. 500, 414 S.E.2d 721

(1992) (convictions of defendants reversed because of the improper use of character
evidence).
142.

199 Ga. App. 746, 406 S.E.2d 112 (1991).

143. Id. at 746, 406 S.E.2d at 113.
144.

201 Ga. App. 477, 411 S.E.2d. 545 (1991).
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fendant, the trial court admitted "for 'impeachment purposes,' a certified
copy of Jabaley's prior plea of nolo contendere to simple battery."""' The
court of appeals emphasis of impeachment purposes suggests that plaintiff's lawyer never contended that the plea was admissible as substantive
evidence of an admission to establish defendant's liability. Consequently,
the court of appeals evaluated the admissibility of the evidence strictly by
the rules governing the use of convictions to impeach a witness. The court
acknowledged that pleas of nolo contendere to felonies and crimes involving moral turpitude are admissible to impeach a witness. " ' Because misdemeanor battery does not constitute a crime of moral turpitude, however, the court of appeals held that defendant's plea of nolo contendere
was not admissible to impeach him. " "
Among the difficulties which frequently arise in determining the admissibility of convictions to impeach a witness is the question of whether a
crime involves moral turpitude. During the survey period, the supreme
court held that the offense of driving under the influence is not a crime' of
moral turpitude: "' A misdemeanor conviction for writing a bad check,
however, does involve moral turpitude and thus, can be used to
impeach. 49,
Finally, the court of appeals reaffirmed (as it is forced to do at least
once every survey period) that a conviction offered to impeach a witness's
general credibility cannot be proved on cross-examination. Rather, a conviction of a felony of a crime of moral turpitude only can be established
through a certified copy of the conviction.150
C. Examination of Witnesses Generally
The Butler/Allison debate,51 so called by the author, which centers on
the question of whether an expert witness can testify that an alleged victim of child abuse was in fact molested, unfortunately has begun to permeate other areas of evidentiary law. This debate arises from the incredibly difficult burden a prosecutor faces in an attempt to prove a
defendant's guilt when the victim is very young, often incompetent, or
otherwise unable to testify. The courts and the General Assembly seem to
145. Id. at 477, 411 S.E.2d at 546.
146. Id. See Tilley v. Page, 181 Ga. App. 98, 351 S.E.2d 464 (1986).
147. 201 Ga. at 477, 411 S.E.2d at 546. For a somewhat less clear discussion of the distinction between substantive and impeachment evidence, see the court of appeals decision
in White v. State, in which the court suggests that a pending charge of prostitution against a
rape victim may be admissible in the rape trial. 201 Ga. App. 53, 410 S.E.2d 441 (1991).
148. Hall v. Hall, 261 Ga. 188, 402 S.E.2d 726 (1991).
149. Carruth v. Brown, 202 Ga. App. 656,'415 S.E.2d 470 (1992).
150. Love v. State, 199 Ga. App. 482, 405 S.E.2d 308 (1991).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 166-93.
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be involved in a never ending struggle to determine how this burden can
be eased without impinging the rights of a defendant. In Guest v.
State, 52 the court of appeals sent a strong statement that may resolve at*
least part of this tangled web-the use of lay witnesses to bolster the
credibility of a victim. In Guest a police officer testified that he obtained
a warrant for defendant's arrest because, after viewing the young victim's
videotaped statement, he felt the victim was "'qualified . . . and . . .
credible in [his] eyes.' "'" Defendant objected, contending that the credibility of the victim was a matter exclusively within the province of the
jury. The trial court overruled defendant's objection and denied his motion for a mistrial. On appeal the court of appeals disagreed even though
154
defendant arguably "opened the door" to the detective's testimony.
The court relied upon the supreme court's decision in Smith v. State, "
which held that an expert cannot express an opinion that the alleged victim was being truthful in her account of molestation notwithstanding the
fact that the expert's testimony came in rebuttal to defendant's evidence,
based upon testimony sby several witnesses, that the victim could not be
1
believed under oath.
The three judge panel decision in Guest is perhaps of particular significance in view of the full court's prior decision in Calloway v. State.1 7 In
Calloway a social worker testified that the mother believed the victim's
account of sexual abuse by her father. A five judge majority of the court
of appeals dodged the issue of whether this testimony constituted improper bolstering of a witness, noting that defendant had the opportunity
to cross-examine the mother and thus the social worker's testimony about
what the mother said was admissible. 58 Judges Beasley and Andrews,
however, concurred specially, and in the concurring opinion of Judge
Beasley, she wrote that the social worker's testimony was an inadmissible
opinion on the credibility of a witness.1 59 Judge Beasley nevertheless concurred because she felt this testimony was cumulative of other evidence
and therefore harmless. 6 0 In dissent, Judges Carley and Birdsong agreed
with Judges Beasley and Andrews that the testimony was clearly inadmissible."" However, they concluded that the testimony was not harm152. 201 Ga. App. 506, 411 S.E.2d 364 (1991).
153. Id. at 507, 411 S.E.2d at 364.
154. Id.
155. 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158, cert. denied sub nom. Georgia v. Smith, 493 U.S. 825

(1989).
156. 259 Ga. at 138, 377 S.E.2d at 161.
157. 199 Ga. App. 272, 404 S.E.2d 811 (1991).
158. Id. at 273, 404 S.E.2d at 813.
159. Id. at 275, 404 S.E.2d at 815 (Beasley, J., concurring specially).
160. Id.
161. Id. (Carley & Birdsong, JJ., dissenting).
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less. 162 Interestingly, Judge McMurray wrote the majority opinion in Calloway and yet joined in the subsequent panel decision in Guest, and
Judge Sognier wrote the panel opinion in Guest even though he was in
the majority in Calloway.'" It therefore appears that the holding in
Guest, rather than the holding in Calloway, reflects the true state of the
law, and the court of appeals clearly will not allow any witness, expert or
lay, to opine on the credibility of a victim.
D. Sequestration of Witnesses
The law governing the competency of witnesses who have violated a
sequestration order is a good example of how appellate decisions can lead
lawyers and judges astray. For over a decade, Georgia law clearly has
been that the violation of the rule of sequestration does not render a witness incompetent but rather goes to the weight of his testimony.' 64 Nevertheless, some earlier decisions hold that a violating witness is incompetent to testify.' 66 Accordingly, the appellate courts are occasionally faced
with appeals in which a witness has been excluded from testifying because he has listened to the testimony of other witnesses. In Weathers v.
State,' 6 the court of appeals reaffirmed that the violation of an order of
sequestration does not render a witness incompetent to testify.' 7
VI.

A.

OPINION EVIDENCE

Subject Matter of Opinion Evidence,

It was bound to happen. For five years now, the author has attempted
to catalog the numerous cases which have struggled with the issue of
whether the prosecution, facing the difficult task of proving a defendant
guilty of molesting a small child, can introduce expert testimony that the
child was, in fact, sexually molested. The supreme court initiated this debate seven years ago in two seemingly conflicting decisions rendered one
after the other, State v. Butler'" and Allison v. State.169 As the courts
began grudgingly to allow prosecutors to use such expert testimony, it
certainly was only a matter of time before defendants seized the opportu162. Id.
163. 199 Ga. App. 272, 404 S.E.2d 811; 201 Ga. App. 506, 411 S.E.2d 364.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981).
Wessner v. State, 236 Ga. 162, 167, 223 S.E.2d 141, 144 (1976).
202 Ga. App. 849, 415 S.E.2d 690 (1992).
Id. at 850, 415 S.E.2d at 692.
256 Ga. 448, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986).
256 Ga. 851, 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987).
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nity to use expert testimony on their behalf. This happened during the
survey period.
Before discussing this year's cases addressing the Butler/Allison debate, it is necessary to discuss briefly the history of the debate. In Butler
the supreme court, with three justices dissenting, held that an expert
could testify that a child had been sexually molested. 17° The dissent argued that such testimony is merely a prosecutorial mechanism to bolster
the child's credibility and that it completely usurps the function of the
jury. 1 Then, in Allison, the supreme court held that a psychologist could
17
not testify that an alleged molestation victim had been sexually abused.
However, an expert could testify as to the "lineaments" of something
called the child abuse syndrome.1 7 8 Since these decisions, the court of appeals, and on occasion the supreme court, has struggled with this issue.
The court of appeals has noted pointedly that the supreme court, by
sending conflicting signals, has hardly been helpful.17 '
To the extent the courts have been able to render a definitive statement on this issue, it is arguably found, ironically, in Justice Hunt's dissenting opinion in Harris v. State.'7 In Harris the supreme court reversed the court of appeals holding that the trial court properly admitted
expert testimony that a victim of alleged child abuse had been sexually
molested." In dissent, Justice Hunt thought the expert's opinion was admissible.1 7 7 Justice Hunt felt that the effect of the majority's decision was
that an expert could "opine that his findings . . . were consistent with
those [one] would expect to find in a child who had been molested.' ' 7 8
However, the expert could not say that "'my findings indicate the child
' "'17 By reversing defendant's conviction, Justice
was molested ..
Hunt argued that the State was being penalized for "semantical
.distinction."' 8o0
Regardless of one's opinion as to whether an expert should be allowed
to testify that an act of molestation has taken place, it is difficult to dispute Justice Hunt's conclusion that the courts are making semantical distinctions which really have no difference. In Cooper v. State,' defendant

170. 256 Ga. at 449, 349 S.E.2d at 685.
171. Id. at 453, 349 S.E.2d at 686 (Smith, Weltner & Bell, JJ., dissenting).
172. 256 Ga. at 853,-353 S.E.2d at 808.
173. Id. at 854, 353 S.E.2d at 808.
i74. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 189 Ga. App. 587, 376 S.E.2d 901 (1988).
175. 261 Ga. 386, 387, 405 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1991) (Hunt, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 386-87, 405 S.E.2d at 482.
177. Id. at 387, 405 S.E.2d at 483 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 200 Ga. App. 560, 408 S.E.2d 797 (1991).
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contended that the trial court erroneously admitted an expert's testimony
that the victim "'fit the child abuse syndrome.' "182 The court of appeals
disagreed, citing Allison as authority and noted that it was perfectly perlong as
missible for an expert to testify that a child fits the syndrome so
83
the expert does not testify that the child was, in fact, abused.
The supreme court re-entered the debate during the present survey period in McCartney v. State. 8"' Tragically, the alleged victim of abuse in
McCartney died as the result of his injuries. The trial court permitted a
forensic pathologist to testify that the child suffered from something variously described as childhood maltreatment syndrome, battered child syndrome, and abused child syndrome. The child abuse syndrome discussed
in other Butler/Allison debate cases is a psychological or psychiatric diagnosis that is based largely upon interviews with the alleged victim. The
syndrome in McCartney, however, was based upon the pathologist's examination of the victim's body. In McCartney the pathologist testified
that the child suffered from "abused child syndrome" and that it was his
"opinion that that is the manner by which these injuries occurred that
resulted in the death of this child.""' The supreme court concluded that
the pathologist's'testimony "amounts to an opinion that the child died of
abuse, and in this regard the testimony is unacceptable because it was not
beyond the ability of the jurors themselves to draw the inference."' s The
supreme court cited Allison to support its holding.187 Justices Hunt and
Fletcher dissented without opinion."8 s Presumably, the reasons for their
dissent are found in Justice Hunt's dissenting opinion in Harris which
Justice Fletcher also joined."8 '
Hall v. State' 90 appears to be the first published attempt by a defendant to utilize expert testimony to establish that a child does not suffer
from child abuse syndrome and thus was not molested. In Hall defendant
attempted to introduce the testimony of two witnesses about the behavior
of sexually abused children and whether the victim exhibited such behavior. The trial court, however, sustained the prosecution's objection to this
evidence. On appeal the court of appeals noted that defendant "was not
attempting to elicit a direct opinion on the ultimate issue of whether the
victim had been molested," 1'9 which the court seemed to indicate would
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 560, 408 S.E.2d at 798 (quoting the trial record).
Id.
262 Ga. 156, 414 S.E.2d 227 (1992).
Id. at 158, 414 S.E.2d at 228.
Id.at 159, 414 S.E.2d at 229.
Id.
Id. at 160, 414 S.E.2d at 230 (Hunt & Fletcher, JJ,, dissenting).
261 Ga. 386, 405 S.E.2d 482 (1991) (Hunt & Fletcher, JJ., dissenting).
201 Ga. App. 626, 411 S.E.2d 777 (1991).
Id.at 627, 411 S.E.2d at 778.
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be improper under Allison, or whether the victim had lied about being
molested, which would have been improper under Jennette v. State.1 "5
Rather, defendant wanted to use this testimony to establish that the victim did not exhibit the behavior which one would expect of a sexually
abused child.1 93 This, the court.held, was a proper subject of expert testimony and therefore the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecution's
objection 94
Thus, it appears that after six years, the Butler/Allison debate has
been resolved and, as Justice Hunt noted, the resolution is primarily a
semantic one.'" So long as a prosecutor or a defense attorney does not
actually elicit testimony that a child was or was not sexually abused, it is
permissible to have an expert testify that a child does or does not have
the "lineaments" of the child abuse syndrome.
B. Expert Witnesses
May the opinion of an expert be based upon hearsay? Most lawyers
would probably answer that Georgia law does not permit the admission of
expert testimony if the facts upon which th opinion is based are not in
evidence or if the facts are not within the personal knowledge of the expert. Actually, Georgia law is not this categorical and one can argue that
Georgia courts have substantially relaxed the rule against hearsay as it
applies to expert testimony. In King v. Browning,96 the supreme court
held that if an expert's opinion is based upon hearsay, his lack of per-'
sonal knowledge does not necessitate the exclusion of his opinion testimony but rather raises a question concerning the weight that the jury or
the court should give the opinion. 9 ' King has been cited several times for
this proposition, including in Judge Beasley's dissent in Martin v.
Reed. "
Also during the survey period, the court of appeals, in Randall Memorial Mortuary, Inc. v. O'Quinn,'99 struggled to find a basis to affirm the
trial court's admission of expert testimony based partially on hearsay.
The court conceded, perhaps unnecessarily, that an expert's opinion generally cannot be based upon hearsay. The court avoided this purported
proscription by noting that the expert's opinion was based in part on his
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

197 Ga. App. 580, 398 S.E.2d 734 (1990).
201 Ga. App. at 627, 41i S.E.2d at 778.
Id.
261 Ga. 386, 387, 405 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1991) (Hunt, J., dissenting).
246 Ga. 46, 268 S.E.2d 653 (1980).
Id. at 47, 268"S.E.2d at 654.
200 Ga. App. 775, 777, 409 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1991) (Beasley, J., dissenting).
202 Ga. App. 541, 414 S.E.2d 744 (1992).
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own personal observations and this was sufficient to warrant its admission
into evidence.20
Clearly, the better practice is to be certain that all facts upon which an
expert's opinion are based are admitted into evidence. However, lawyers
the admisshould be aware that authority exists in Georgia that allows
20
sion of expert testimony even if it is based on hearsay. '
In Askew v. State,202 the court of appeals held that the trial court properly admitted an expert witness's testimony notwithstanding her admission, on two occasions, that she did not consider herself an expert.20 2 The
court of appeals reached an apparent contrary conclusion during the present survey period in Martin v. Reed." ' In Martin defendants relied
upon the testimony of an expert to establish that their negligence, if they
were found negligent, did not cause plaintiff's injuries. The expert testified that he was incompetent to analyze x-rays. Because the analysis of
these x-rays was the key issue in the case, the court of appeals concluded
that his opinion had no probative value and should not have been admitted.20 6 In dissent Judge Beasley relied upon the court's opinion in Askew
and concluded that the expert's admission of incompetency should not
have disqualified him from testifying.' 0'
Also during the survey period, the court of appeals held that a neuropsychologist can express an opinion on the causation of a mental disorder
even though that mental disorder emanated from an organic cause.20
VII. HEARSAY
A. Definition of Hearsay
Hearsay, of course, is an out of court statement offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted therein. This simple definition allows quick
analysis of most hearsay issues; a lawyer needs only to determine whether
the out of court statement is being offered to prove (a) that the assertion
in the statement is true or (b) anything else. Of course, nothing in law is
as simple as it seems, and the rule against hearsay is no exception. Unfortunately, however, Georgia lawyers face an additional difficulty occa200. Id. at 543, 414 S.E.2d at 745.
201. See also Southeastern Ambulance Corp. v. Freeman, 185 Ga. App. 119, 363 S.E.2d
571 (1987).
202. 185 Ga. App. 282, 363 S.E.2d 844 (1987).
203. Id. at 282, 363 S.E.2d at 845.
204. 200 Ga. App. 775, 409 S.E.2d 874 (1991).
205. Id. at 776, 409 S.E.2d at 876.
206. Id. at 777, 409 S.E.2d at 877.
207. Morris v. Chandler Exterminators, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 816, 409 S.E.2d 677 (1991),
rev'd, 262 Ga. 257, 416 S.E.2d 277 (1992).
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sioned by the Georgia evidence code's antiquated attempt to define hearsay as "that which does not derive its value solely from the credit of the
witness but rests mainly on the veracity and competency of other persons." ' Fortunately, however, this definition is so outdated that the
Georgia courts generally ignore it and resort to the more traditional definition of hearsay.
The court of appeals decision in Thompson v. State20 ' provides a good
example of hearsay analysis. In Thompson a police officer attempting to
verify defendant's identity, asked a radio dispatcher to call a telephone
number which defendant said was the telephone number of his mother.
The police officer asked the dispatcher to verify defendant's identity with
the mother. Defendant unsuccessfully objected to the police officer's testimony of the results of the dispatcher's inquiry. The trial court reasoned
that the officer's testimony was admissible because it was not offered to
prove the truth of the statements made by the mother and the dispatcher, but was offered to explain the officer's conduct.2 10 The court of
appeals acknowledged that out of court statements may be admitted to
explain conduct but only if the conduct of the witness is a matter "'concerning which the truth must be found.' "211 In other words, the witness's
conduct must first be relevant. The court held that the police officer's
conduct was not in issue and therefore
the trial court erroneously. admit21 2
ted the officer's hearsay testimony.
B. Res Gestae
The Georgia Supreme Court has held that the res gestae doctrine is an
inexplicable enigma. 2 Last year's survey suggested that perhaps the res
gestae doctrine served a "perversely legitimate purpose by allowing courts
to admit evidence that is not admissible under any 'legitimate' theory,
but which justice demands should be admitted.

21

4

However, hard cases

make bad law and it is no doubt frustrating to lawyers who find cases
affirming the admission of hearsay statements made forty-eight hours after an incident, and then see the court of appeals hold in Lee v. Peacock, 2 1 ' that a statement made in an ambulance forty-five minutes after

an incident is not part of the res gestae.
208.
209.
210.
211.
S.E.2d
212.
213.
214.
215.

O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1 (1982).
201 Ga. App. 646, 411 S.E.2d 886 (1991).
Id. at 646, 411 S.E.2d at 886.
Id. at 648, 411 S.E.2d at 887-88 (citing Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865, 867, 294
482, 482 (1982) quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-3-2 (1982)).
Id., 411 S.E.2d at 888.
Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 227, 290 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1982).
Treadwell, supra note 57, at 279.
199 Ga. App. 192, 404 S.E.2d 473 (1991).
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Fans of the res gestae doctrine will welcome the court of appeals decision in Williams v. State.2 1' " In Williams a witness testified that the victim of an assault told her, approximately an hour after the assault, that
217
"the boy who. had driven him to Lake City hit him and robbed him.
The victim was unable to testify at trial because of ill health, but his
hearsay statement, as recounted by the witness, was sufficient to identify
defendant as the perpetrator. However, the trial court ruled, after the
witness testified, that this testimony was not part of the res gestae and
thus instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. Although the remaining evidence against defendant was scant, the jury convicted him nonetheless. On appeal defendant contended that, once the testimony was excluded, the remaining evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction.2 1 8' The court of appeals agreed.2 1 9 However, the court of ap-

peals disagreed that the witness's testimony had been properly excluded. 220 Although the court in Lee went to some length to explain that a
trial judge's decision that evidence is not admissible under the res gestae
doctrine would not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous and an abuse of
discretion, this deference to the trial court was not apparent in Williams.
The court simply held that the trial court "erred.

'221

The court also re-

jected defendant's contention that the admission of this evidence violated
defendant's constitutional right to confront his witnesses.2 22 Applying the
Ohio v. Roberts223 test, discussed below, the court stated that the res gestae doctrine is "a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule '22 and
thus apparently satisfied the requirement of Roberts that the evidence
fall within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception." 2 2 ' No doubt, there are

those who will take issue with the assertion that the res gestae doctrine is
a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
C.

The Child Hearsay Statute

As discussed above, the use of expert testimony in child molestation
cases has proven to be particularly troublesome for the appellate courts.
It is no accident that the appellate courts have had nearly as much difficulty in establishing the permissible bounds for the use of hearsay evi216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

202 Ga. App. 82, 413 S.E.2d 256 (1991).
Id. at 83, 413 S.E.2d at 256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 84, 413 S.E.2d at 257.
Id.
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
101 Ga. App. at 84, 413 S.E.2d at 258
448 U.S. at 57.
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dence in child molestation cases. In both situations the genesis of the
problem is the same-prosecutors face incredibly difficult burdens in
child abuse cases. Due, no doubt, to the heinous nature of the crime, the
General Assembly and the courts have moved to ease these burdens.
These efforts, however, have collided with constitutional and evidentiary
principles designed to protect the rights of the accused. There appears to
be a particularly violent collision in the offing with regard to Georgia's
child hearsay statute.
Prior to the adoption of the child hearsay statute, the courts engaged in
contorted gyrations to find ways to admit hearsay statements by victims
of child abuse. Frequently, courts would' use the amorphus res gestae doctrine. 226 Even the res gestae doctrine has its limitations, however, and in
Cuzzort v. State22 the supreme court, adopting a completely new rule of
evidence, held that a prior consistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence against an accused.2 28
The General Assembly stepped into the fray in 1986 with the adoption
of the child hearsay statute.2 29 Although the statute went a long way toward the resolution of the problem, it contained a gaping hole; the statute
required that the child be "available to testify in the proceedings. 2 220 The
court of appeals held that a child found to be incompetent to testify was
not available to testify and therefore his out of court statement was not
admissible under the child hearsay statute.2"
The General Assembly reacted quickly by amending the competency
statute to provide that "[in [all] cases involving child molestation, and in
all other criminal cases in which a child was a victim of or a witness to
any crime, any such child shall be competent to testify."2' 2
Early attacks on the constitutionality of the child hearsay statute were
easily rebuffed, but the court of appeals decision in Rolader v. State2 33
suggests that future attacks may meet with more success. In Rolader defendant contended that the admission of a victim's out of court statement
violated the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution.23 4
The court of appeals cited the landmark case of Ohio v. Roberts"'8 that
established a two-part test for determining whether hearsay evidence vio226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See, e.g., Eaton v. State, 184 Ga. App. 645, 362 S.E.2d 375 (1987).
254 Ga. 745, 334 S.E.2d 661 (1985).
Id. at 745, 334 S.E.2d at 662.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (Supp. 1992).
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Ward v. State, 186 Ga. App. 503, 368 S.E.2d 139 (1988).
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-5 (Supp. 1992).
202 Ga. App. 134, 413 S.E.2d 752 (1991).
Id. at 139, 413 S.E.2d at 753.
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lated the confrontation clause. " ' First, the declarant must be unavailable
to testify at trial. Second, the declarant's out of court statement must
bear adequate "indicia of reliability."2 37 Generally speaking, reliability is
inferred if the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
The court of appeals noted that Georgia's child hearsay statute is premised upon the requirement that the child must be available to testify
before his out of court statement can be used. 38 The court of appeals
thus concluded that "to the extent that the confrontation clause conditions the admissibility of such evidence on the child's unavailability to
testify, it would appear that the requirements of our statute may conflict
with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment." 9 Fortunately, the
court of appeals dodged this issue, concluding that the out of court statements at issue were nbt sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted.4 0 Thus,
there is no precedential effect to the court of appeals dicta and, in any
event, Judge Beasley concurred specially, noting that she did not concur
with the court's suggestion that the child hearsay statute violated the
24
Sixth Amendment. '
Actually, the dilemma is not as grave as suggested by the court. It is
true that for many years courts and scholars generally assumed that Ohio
v. Roberts24 2 established a universal requirement that a declarant be unavailable bef6re his out of court statement could be used in a criminal
proceeding. The rationale for this requirement was that if the declarant
were available to testify, there is no need to implicate the confrontation
clause by using his out of court statement. However, in Idaho v.
Wright,243 the Supreme Court held that "the general requirement of unavailability did not apply to incriminating out-of-court statements made
by a nontestifying co-conspirator. ' 2" 4 Thus, some exceptions to the hearsay rule require a demonstration of unavailability to satisfy the confrontation clause but others do not.
The Supreme Court's decision in Wright, although involving the use of
hearsay evidence in child molestation cases and relied upon by defendant
in Calloway,2' 4 did not address the issue of whether child hearsay statutes
236. 202 Ga. App. at 139, 413 S.E.2d at 757.
237. 448 U.S. at 65.
238. 202 Ga. App. at 139-40, 413 S.E.2d at 757.
239. Id. at 140, 413 S.E.2d at 757.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 142, 413 S.E.2d at 759 (Beasley, J., concurring). A special concurrence by a
member of the three judge panel of the court of appeals deprives the decision of any precedential effect. CT. APP. R. 35(b).
242. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
243. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
244. Id. at 3146.
245. 199 Ga. App. 272, 404 S.E.2d 811 (1991).
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that allow the use of hearsay even though the child is available to testify,
violated the confrontation clause.2 40 Indeed, Wright did not even address
directly a child hearsay statute but rather involved the admission of child
hearsay under a residual exception to Idaho's rule against hearsay.2 7
Thus, the issue, which no doubt will be resolved in -the near future, is
whether the availability requirement of the child hearsay statute runs
afoul of the unavailability requirement of Roberts. Given the courts understandable desire to facilitate the prosecution of alleged child abusers,
it is reasonable to conclude that the courts will hold that the Georgia
child hearsay statute, like the coconspirator exception to the rule against
hearsay addressed in Wright, is not a hearsay exception that requires the
declarant to be unavailable.
It is ironic that the availability requirement of the child hearsay statute, which was adopted to preserve a defendant's right to confrontation,
may run afoul of the United States Supreme Court's attempt to ensure
that hearsay evidence is only used in limited situations. This irony is exemplified by the court of appeals decision in Lang v. State.24 8 In Lang the
trial judge concluded that a child was incompetent to testify and, thus,
struck the child's in-court testimony, notwithstanding the amendment to
the child hearsay statute providing that. victims of child abuse are
deemed competent to testify.2 4 Nevertheless, the jury convicted defendant, and on appeal he contended that the effect of the trial court's ruling,
no doubt made at defendant's insistence, was to render the child unavailable to testify and, because she was unavailable, the child hearsay statute
was not applicable. Therefore, defendant argued, the testimony of the
victim's mother and two police officers about statements made by the
child was inadmissible.250 The court of appeals agreed and reversed defendant's conviction.2 1 The court reversed' defendant's conviction, notwithstanding his failure to object to the disputed testimony because, as

246.

110 S. Ct. at 3147.

247. Id. Wright, incidentally, held that the residual exception to the rule against hearsay
was not sufficiently established to satisfy the trustworthiness requirement, and thus, the
reliability of the evidence had to be established on a case-by-case basis. Id. Presumably,
Georgia's child hearsay statute is also not a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, and
thus, the trustworthiness of evidence admitted under the statute must be determined on a

case-by-case basis.
248.

201 Ga. App. 836, 412 S.E.2d 866 (1991).

249. Id. at 837, 412 S.E.2d at 867.
250. Id. at 836, 412 S.E.2d at 867.
251. Id.
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has no probative value even though it
discussed above, hearsay evidence
6
is admitted without objection.2

On a more mundane note, the court of appeals held in Gregg v. State25
that the requirement of the child hearsay statute that the court find sufficient indicia of reliability is not a condition precedent to the admissibility
of the out of court statement.2 0 ' Thus, an appellate court, when considering the admissibility of an out of court statement by a child, is not limited to evidence of reliability adduced at a pretrial hearing but rather
may consider the totality of the circumstances, including evidence adduced at trial. However, it is well established that the "indicia of reliability must spring from the circumstances of the statement." ' 255 Thus, the
trustworthiness of the statement cannot be established by corroborating
evidence, but rather the statement "must possess indicia of reliability by
.
virtue of its inherent trustworthiness.""5
D. Statements Made for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment
In Lee v. Peacock,257 appellant's husband fell while in appellee's store
and broke his leg. Three days later, he died of complications arising from
surgery on his broken leg. The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment after concluding that statements made by the decedent as to the cause of the fall were inadmissible.2 58 First, as noted above,
the trial court ruled, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the decedent's statement in the ambulance while in route to a hospital were not
admissible under the res gestae doctrine.2 5 The trial court also held that
statements recorded in medical records were not admissible to establish
the cause of the decedent's fall. 2s ' A six judge majority of the court of
appeals (with two of those judges refusing to concur in the division of the
opinion addressing the admissibility of the decedent's statements recorded in the medical records) affirmed, holding that "[s]uperfluous recitations in medical reports of facts reported by a patient, particularly
those with a self-serving litigative potential to the maker, should be
viewed most critically, as the object of all legal investigation is the search
252. Id. A different panel -of the court of appeals, although not addressing this precise
issue, held that the child hearsay statute did not violate the confrontation clause. Smith v.
State, 199 Ga. App. 378, 405 S.E.2d 78 (1991).
253. 201 Ga. App. 238, 411 S.E.2d 65 (1991).
254. Id. at 239, 411 S.E.2d at 67.
255. Id. at 240, 411 S.E.2d at 68.
256. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
257. 199 Ga. App. 192, 404 S.E.2d 473 (1991).
258. Id. at 192, 404 S.E.2d at 473-74.
259. Id. at 193, 404 S.E.2d at 474.
260. Id.
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for truth." 61 The court held that the decedent's description of what
caused him to fall had no medical significance and, thus, was not admissible under O.C.G.A. section 24-3-4 which allows out of court statements
made for purposes of diagnosis or other medical reasons.2 " In dissent
Judge Banke, joined by Judges McMurray and Cooper, argued that the
decedent's statements to the admitting physician were admissible because
O.C.G.A. section 24-3-4 specifically allows the admission of statements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, including statements concerning "the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof.'"2 3 Of course, O.C.G.A. section 24-3-4 also provides
that statements are admissible only "as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis
or treatment."2 6 4 Judge Banke asserted that statements concerning the
cause of the fall are pertinent to medical treatment and were of particular
medical significance in this case because of the possibility that the insured's fall may have resulted from a seizure or some other physical
2 5
infirmity.
Consistent with Lee, the supreme Court held in Howard v. State"' that
the trial court erroneously admitted a physician's testimony about a victim's statements concerning the circumstances of the shooting, which
eventually led to the victim's death.2 6 7 The supreme court reasoned that
the victim's account of what transpired was not reasonably pertinent to
26 8
the doctor's diagnosis or treatment.
E.

The Residual Exception

Georgia does not have a "residual exception" to the rule against hearsay such as that found in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 2" 9 However, the
court of appeals decision in Patterson v. State7 0 may be authority for
such an exception. If so, then this rule could be enunciated as "if you
need it bad enough, its admissible." In Patterson the trial court admitted
a detective's testimony concerning a statement made by defendant's wife
which implicated defendant.27 1 The wife, after invoking her marital privi261.
262.
263.
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lege, did not testify at trial, and thus, defendant was unable to crossexamine her concerning her statement. The court apparently concluded
that the testimony was admissible under O.C.G.A. section 24-3-1(b),
which provides that "[h]earsay evidence is admitted only in specified
cases from necessity."' 72 However, the court did not elaborate on how this
provision justified the admission of the detective's testimony. The court
rejected defendant's confrontation clause argument, finding that the dictates of Ohio v. Roberts27 3 were satisfied because the declarant was not
what the defendavailable to testify and the detective's testimony2 about
4
ant's wife told him was sufficiently trustworthy.
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